Merion
New here? Start with the Merion README. This page is the full spec.
Pitch: the agent gets a real computer; you keep the keys, the policy, and the right to leave.
Merion is a personal workstation for an untrusted agent. Merion is the version you run on your own hardware: you run it, you read it, you take it with you.
Zyvor Production License v1.0, same as FluxVM. Merion is a product layer in Fabric on FluxVM — not a third repo and not a second VMM.
Docs home: fabric/docs/merion/ (this tree).
CLI: fabric/scripts/merionctl (alias-worthy as merionctl on PATH).
Runtime: fabric/agent-runtime (Sentinel, vault, egress ask, browser, approvals).
Hypervisor: FluxVM Phase 6 security_profile only.
How to test (same as CI)
# From fabric repo root — no KVM required
cargo test --manifest-path agent-runtime/Cargo.toml --lib
cargo test --manifest-path agent-runtime/Cargo.toml policy -- --nocapture
# Full Merion end-to-end (live runtime + FluxVM stub + merionctl)
./scripts/merion-e2e.sh
# Lab live FluxVM proof (Merion 0.1 release gate)
./scripts/merion-live-lab.sh
# Runtime control-plane e2e (proxy / Sentinel / DLP / phone approvals)
cargo build --manifest-path agent-runtime/Cargo.toml --release
BIN=agent-runtime/target/release/zyvor-fabric-agent-runtime \
./agent-runtime/scripts/e2e-no-fluxvm.sh
GitHub Actions: .github/workflows/merion.yml
Hands-on: Tutorial 16 · Tutorial 17 — PDF brief
Evidence and status: Security profiles · Roadmap
Production checklist: PRODUCTION.md
FluxVM measured profiles (sibling repo): ./scripts/test-security-profiles.sh
Quiet part (read this first)
Until Merion 0.2 on real SNP/TDX hardware with a user-held wrapping key:
The host can still see a measured VM.
Evidence class software-test must never be marketed as “the operator cannot read this.” We state it up front.
Design principles
Treat the model as compromised the moment it reads a webpage.
- One persistent Linux computer per person, not a chat session.
- Two domains on one box: untrusted agent cell vs host-side authority.
- Agent never sees real passwords; surrogates swap at the egress boundary.
- Approvals are capabilities bound to a connector, not a sentence in the chat.
- Browser driver sees an accessibility tree, not raw DOM + JS.
Stack
Merion (product) → Fabric (control plane) → FluxVM (cell + host eBPF). Signed policy, and CONNECT 0 from Merion’s journal + FluxVM’s pin.
Architecture
You (phone / laptop / YubiKey)
| wrapping key + approval channel
v
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HOST (Linux + KVM) — FluxVM node you control |
| |
| [Merion Sentinel] signed policy + egress ask/sentinel + host TC/eBPF (`deny_udp`) |
| ^ sole egress + connector authority |
| | |
| [Vault / authd] secrets sealed to your key or vTPM |
| | surrogate in, real secret only at approved egress |
| v |
| [Merion Supervisor] measured/confidential FluxVM guest |
| +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | FIRECRACKER / QEMU MICROVM (untrusted agent cell) | |
| | agent runtime + tools + workspace | |
| | no raw secrets, no CAP_NET_ADMIN, no host fs | |
| | brokered Chromium (a11y tree only) | |
| +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| durable state: postgres/sqlite on host, not in the cell |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
Security profiles (FluxVM Phase 6):
| Profile | Evidence | Hardware attestation? |
|---|---|---|
standard | none | no |
measured | software-test | never |
confidential-snp / confidential-tdx | sev-snp / tdx only after verified hardware run | gated |
Merion 0.1 — shipped
- BYO model — a manifest's
model_socketnames an OpenAI-compatible endpoint (Qwen, DeepSeek, GLM, a local server) that an agent calls withctx.model.chat()through the egress broker, and that CLI agents are pointed at; it also travels with pack / unpack. One-click use cases can opt in to a host-side model step, gated by the vault and an approval. See MODELS.md and MODEL.md. - Signed YAML Sentinel — Merion mode (
ZYVOR_AGENT_MERION_MODE=1) fail-closed;sentinel/merion.policy.yaml. - Firecracker / measured cell — agent kernel ≠ host kernel intent;
security_profile: measured→ evidencesoftware-test. - Phone-only high-risk approvals — buy / send / delete via webhook /
/v1/approvals, never in chat. - Pack / unpack —
merionctl pack→ USB or S3 →merionctl unpackon another FluxVM node. - Cockpit + browser live view — visible taint, last decisions, tab listing (
/keep/browser), screenshot + read-only screencast; input takeover not implemented. - One-click use cases —
/app/merion+merion-demo.sh <id>: PDF brief, contract clauses, security questionnaire, meeting actions, log triage, SBOM summary, CSV cleanup; each expectsegress_connects: 0(demos/README.md). - Host eBPF pin (FluxVM) —
deny_udp+ gateway-only ports; no PacketWolf required (confine.md).
Lab gate: ./scripts/merion-live-lab.sh. Guest boot needs a FluxVM template (Tutorial 11).
Merion 0.2
- User-held unwrap (phone / YubiKey) onto an attested guest.
- Attestation receipt on the phone: image hash, profile achieved, evidence class.
- Confidential profiles: no host recover path.
- Flip FluxVM
security.snp_launch_verified/tdx_launch_verifiedonly after one hardware run.
What not to add
- Approvals inside the agent chat
- Helper-app Messages/Notes/file slurp as default
- Silent training on trajectories
extra_argscounting as confidential- A second control plane besides FluxVM
Layout (in Fabric — no third repo)
fabric/docs/merion/
KEEP.md # pitch, honesty clause
KEEP-0.2.md # hardware gate
STATUS.md
confine.md # FluxVM host eBPF (deny_udp)
demos/ # one-click use cases (pdf-brief, contract-clauses, log-triage, ...)
sentinel/ # merion.policy.yaml example
vault/ cell/ browser/ approve/ cockpit/
fabric/scripts/merionctl
fabric/scripts/merion-demo-pdf.sh
fabric/agent-runtime/ # policy, model_socket, cockpit API, export-token, demos
Related code
- FluxVM: https://github.com/zyvorai/fluxvm — Phase 6
security_profile(hypervisor only) - Fabric: agent-runtime +
fabricctl keep/merionctl+docs/merion/(this product surface) - Design precursor:
fabric/docs/design/confidential-agent-vms.md
There is no separate Merion git repository.