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On behalf of

Status: built in part, default behaviour unchanged. Tested against a local token server; no real identity provider.

What already existed​

Per-person credentials (oauth.connection): the host mints a short-lived access token from that person's own stored refresh token, optionally narrowed with oauth.scope. The agent never sees either token.

What this adds​

  1. identity on every egress.http journal row.
    • autonomous: the request named no credential.
    • delegated: it used a person's own connection; acting_for names the session's user.
    • service: it used a credential the operator holds for the whole host.
  2. oauth.audience, sent as resource (RFC 8707), so a provider that honours it issues a token only that API accepts. A provider that ignores it issues the token it always did.

identity is a scalar and is on the OTLP and recording allowlists; acting_for is not.

Not done​

  • RFC 8693 token exchange (swapping a person's token for a narrower one at another service).
  • Sender-constrained tokens (DPoP or mTLS binding). Tokens stay bearer tokens, held only by the host.
  • Journal rows for the CONNECT proxy path.